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This paper examines the social relations of production at a British 
metal-trades firm throughout the 19th century. The case study re-
veals the existence of two distinct political apparatuses, or regimes, 
identified in previous literature, that govern production relations. 
The first regime, between 1791 and 1867, is described as patriarchal 
because production is organized around adult, male, internal sub-
contractors and their families. In the second period, roughly 1868-
91, the regime is characterized as paternalistic since it attempts to 
align the interests of capital and worker through family, work, and 
community life. The analysis uncovers social and economic forces 
that undermined the system of internal subcontracting and patriar-
chy and fostered paternalism. Emerging paternalism shaped the 
struggles over the introduction of new technologies that formed the 
basis for the real subordination of labor to capital. 
I told them in the afternoon that I would not have any loss of 
time, that if they neglected my business they might go to those 
who would put up with it, that I was determined I would not 
let them be good for nothing. . . . Some plan must be laid down 
and strictly adhered to to prevent the inconvenience of loss of 
time in the workmen: a present evil must be preferred to 
obviate a constant one. [ARCHIBALD KENRICK, February 7, 
1787] 
With those thoughts in mind, Archibald Kenrick, the first of five genera-
tions of owners of a prominent Midlands hardware firm, addressed issues 
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concerning the control and organization of its work force. In examining 
the experience of this firm over a 100-year period, I wish to illustrate how 
social and economic forces shaped and transformed production relations 
in this period of British capitalism. By making the distinction between 
the labor process and its mode of regulation, this case study attempts to 
expand the empirical basis of Burawoy's (1983, 1984) theoretical work on 
the politics of production. 
Consequently, this paper sets out to achieve three goals. The first is to 
characterize periods of production at the firm along four dimensions: the 
labor process, the market structure, the reproduction of labor power, and 
state intervention—determinant conditions of what Burawoy (1983) has 
called the "factory regime." Second, I will demonstrate how these regimes 
shaped production politics or struggles, especially those concerning the 
introduction of new technologies. And finally, I will argue that the histor-
ical transformation of regimes occurs through a constellation of forces 
emerging from both the contradictory tendencies of capitalist develop-
ment and the social relations of production. 
The case-study method is particularly useful for examining, in detail, 
the historical transformation of the organization of work. To date, few 
such studies exist. The Kenrick family firm is a particularly important 
case since it has an extended history that is relatively well documented 
and spans an important period in the development of British capitalism. 
Moreover, as I shall illustrate, the firm eventually played a central role in 
a branch of Britain's metal and engineering trades by negotiating and 
defining industrywide arrangements concerning price structure, profits, 
and labor relations. My intention, however, is not to argue that this case 
history is necessarily representative of other firms throughout this period; 
in fact, the characteristics I have just cited could very well support the 
argument that the firm was not "average." Rather, by analyzing the 
Kenrick experience, I intend to provide a detailed historical account of 
the ways in which both capital and labor were confronted by the chang-
ing context of production and of the strategies they undertook in defend-
ing and advancing their respective positions. In doing this, I wish to 
illustrate a number of the theoretical concepts that have been developed 
in the literature and to suggest that future work incorporate a more 
explicit examination of the dynamics of change and the conditions and 
consequences of social action. 
T H E LABOR PROCESS A N D T H E POLITICS OF PRODUCTION 
The Braverman-inspired debates of the past decade have produced a 
number of important contributions to understanding the historical trans-
formation of work. Braverman (1974) himself attempted to link changes 
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in the labor process to the structure of the marketplace during the monop-
oly phase of capitalism. Others have provided historical accounts of 
labor-control strategies (Friedman 1977; Edwards 1979; Littler 1982). 
Still others have focused on the social relations of production, emphasiz-
ing the generation of worker "consent" (Burawoy 1979) as well as the 
effect of technology (Wallace and Kallenberg 1982; Zimbalist 1979; Noble 
1977, 1979). 
Recent work by Burawoy (1983, 1984), however, has criticized labor-
process theory for its "underpoliticization" of production. Burawoy ar-
gues for a distinction between the labor process "as a particular organiza-
tion of tasks" and "the political apparatuses of production conceived of as 
its mode of regulation" (1983, p. 589). Thus, the political regulation of 
production and the organization of the production or labor process may 
vary independently of each other. Burawoy calls these political apparat-
uses factory regimes and argues that they play a crucial role in the re-
production of the social relations of work and the regulation of class 
struggles. Through a series of historical comparisons, Burawoy (1984) 
attempts to show how variations in factory regimes account for the rise or 
fall of working-class movements by shaping interests and capacities. 
Following Marx's ([1867] 1976) lead, Burawoy focuses on four crucial 
conditions that determine the character of the factory regime. The first is 
the structure of industry—the degree of competition in the marketplace. 
Marx argued that, during certain periods, the competitive pressures of 
the market threaten the very existence of a firm. Capitalists respond with 
the introduction of new technologies and the intensification of work. As 
Burawoy (1984, p. 251) put it, "Anarchy in the market leads to despotism 
in production: the market is constitutive of the apparatus of production." 
The second condition involves the organization of work or the labor 
process. Here, Burawoy retains the distinction made by Marx (1976, 
p. 645) between the formal and the real subordination of labor to capital. 
Formal subordination occurs as labor is organized under one roof by 
capital. Capital owns the means of production, but the worker still re-
tains control over the labor process. The real subsumption of labor fol-
lows the separation of the conception and execution of the work task by 
capital, and the worker becomes an objective part of production. The 
dependence of the worker on capital forms the third condition of the 
factory regime. Complete dependence implies that workers have no other 
means of subsistence beyond the sale of their labor; under these condi-
tions, there is unity between the reproduction of labor power and the 
mode of production. Finally, Burawoy considers two forms of state inter-
vention. Here, he distinguishes between external and internal regulation 
by the state. In the latter, the state regulates relations among capitalists or 
64 
Organization of Work 
is directly involved in regulating the process of production, whereas in the 
former the state merely preserves the "autonomous workings of market 
forces" (1984, p. 252). 
Burawoy contends that Marx conceived of only one prototypical re-
gime, which Burawoy (1983) calls "market despotism." This regime high-
lights the condition of a competitive marketplace and is further supported 
by the real subordination of labor, the complete dependence of labor on 
capital, and exclusively external state intervention. Burawoy argues that 
Marx took both the complete dependence of labor and exclusively exter-
nal state intervention for granted. As he states, "On examination, how-
ever, not only are they problematic, but their variation is crucial in the 
determination of factory regimes" (1984, p. 252). 
Market despotism, he argues, is one particular type of factory regula-
tion; moreover, "The four conditions of market despotism are rarely real-
ized simultaneously. By treating them as four independent variables we 
can illuminate their independent effects on the form of the factory regime 
. . . " (1984, pp. 252-53). Historical analysis (Burawoy 1984) reveals the 
conditions that engender different types of factory regimes and highlights 
the varying importance of each of the four variables for the character of a 
regime. For example, a patriarchal regime is associated with the condi-
tions of market despotism, with the exception of the formal rather than 
the real subordination of labor, thus highlighting the importance of the 
labor process. Under this regime, adult male subcontractors work under 
one roof but retain control over the production process. Here, the family 
is harnessed in the factory under the control and authority of the pa-
triarch, and direct capital involvement in the organization of production 
is limited (Hartmann 1976). 
In contrast, under a paternalistic regime, capital is increasingly in-
volved, both ideologically and materially, in the lives of workers. This 
regime underlines the importance of limited competition and is supported 
by the real subordination of labor and by worker dependence on one 
employer. Under these circumstances, employers may provide welfare 
benefits to workers and participate in and contribute to community proj-
ects, churches, and other institutions (Joyce 1980). This style of paternal-
ism unites family, work, and community life and attempts to align the 
interests of capital and worker. Other regimes are also possible. Burawoy 
(1984) characterizes the factory regime of early throstle textile mills in 
England as a company state—a characterization that highlights the labor 
process and the formal subordination of labor—in which millowners 
dominate the entire community through political as well as economic 
power. Burawoy's model also permits the consideration of regimes under 
advanced capitalism, where consent prevails over coercion, which points 
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to the importance of worker dependence on wage employment (Burawoy 
1983). In these "hegemonic" factory regimes, state social insurance re-
duces dependence; thus new modes of factory regulation are required. 
C O N T R A D I C T I O N S A N D T H E FORCES OF C H A N G E 
While Burawoy's concept of the factory regime provides an important 
distinction from views that focus more narrowly on the labor process, he 
fails to develop adequately at least one important aspect of his ideas on 
factory politics. His framework, presented thus far, lacks an explicit 
explanation for understanding the historical transformation of factory 
regimes. 
In his analysis of early textile industries, Burawoy (1984) establishes 
the conditions necessary for the existence of a number of different factory 
regimes. Further, he attempts to link, causally, the transformation of 
these regimes to the four determinant conditions. He states, for example, 
that in Lancashire " . . . the change from the formal to the real subsump-
tion of labor was accompanied by the concentration and centralization of 
capital, so that . . . we find a paternalistic regime replacing patriarchal 
despotism" (p. 264). Yet, what caused the change to the real subordina-
tion of labor and increased market concentration in the first place? Did 
these conditions form the basis of paternalism, or did paternalism provide 
the basis for the real subordination of labor? In essence, how do we move 
from one regime to the next? Although Burawoy establishes the essential 
conditions for the existence of factory regimes, he is less successful in 
explaining their transformation. His narrative alludes to a number of 
factors, but the forces of change are not fully drawn out. 
Moreover, one consequence of "bracketing" different types of factory 
regimes into specific sociohistorical periods, as Burawoy has done, is tha t 
we lose the fundamentally recursive nature of social life (Giddens 1983); 
both the conditions for and the consequences of social action must be 
considered. Although the four determinant conditions shape the character 
of the factory regime and thereby the interests and capacities of the actors 
involved, such conditions are just as much an outcome of previous action 
as they are a circumstance of the present. By conceptualizing the condi-
tions of regimes in more reflexive terms, we can better understand their 
production, reproduction, and transformation. 
The position I advance here is that factory politics reflect the vested-
interest strategies of both capital and labor, and, while shaping interests 
and capacities, the conditions and form of the existing factory regime a l so 
reflect the cumulative effect of previous actions. Through the act of p r o -
duction, capital and labor produce and reproduce their own existence a s 
well as that of capitalism itself through the application of "s t ruc tura l 
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principles" (Giddens 1983)—the institutionalized rules and resources of 
recursive social practice. Yet, in this process, actors may generate or 
confront situations that oppose these principles of reproduction; we may 
consider these opposing forces as contradictions. It is within the dynamics 
of both social and economic contraditions that I wish to locate the trans-
formation of factory regimes. 
Marx (1976) and a number of his contemporaries (see Sweezy [1942] 
1970; Mandel 1975; Wright 1978) considered contradictions and crises 
structural features of capitalist production; they have identified a number 
of these conditions. Basic contradictions emerge from both the economic 
and social relations of production and may occur at various levels: at the 
level of the state, the economy, or the firm. State intervention, often 
undertaken in an effort to manage crises, may be in the interests of all 
capitalists, in the institutional self-interest of the state (Offe 1983), or 
both, but may also come into conflict with the interests of individual 
capitalists, potentially generating new crises. Economically based con-
tradictions include an oscillating business cycle creating overproduction, 
underconsumption, the centralization of capital, the destructive aspects 
of competition, and, if unchecked, a falling rate of profit (Marx 1976), all 
of which may threaten capital's ability to realize profit and engage in 
accumulation. 
In addition to contradictions that emerge from outside the immediate 
sphere of production, others may develop at the level of the firm that 
either challenge capital's dominant position in the production process or 
force labor to evaluate its role in that process, bringing about struggle and 
change. In this case, the social relations of production come into conflict 
with the forces of production (i.e., the power to transform nature through 
labor). In summary, changes in the determinant conditions of factory 
regimes are the result of shifting social and economic forces that alter the 
context of production. The character of a particular regime reflects these 
changing conditions as both capital and labor confront them in pursuit of 
their vested interests. What follows is a comparative analysis of two 
production regimes in one firm in early British capitalism. This compari-
son reveals the role of regimes in regulating the social relations of produc-
tion and illuminates the contradictions that undermined and changed the 
context of their existence. 
THE F O U N D A T I O N S OF PATRIARCHY, 1791-1867 
The Kenrick iron foundry dates from 1791, the year Archibald Kenrick, a 
plater by trade, leased a plot of land in the village of West Bromwich, 
outside Birmingham. The firm began producing cast-iron "odd work" for 
domestic consumption and commercial building, which eventually 
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evolved into what was known as the hollow ware trade. Traditional prod-
ucts of the trade included general hardware such as hinges, doorknobs, 
cast nails, and the like as well as domestic hollow ware such as pots and 
pans. The production of these items required artisans to perform skilled 
tasks in molding, dressing, enameling, and finishing the cast hollowware. 
The organization of the firm at this time was more or less typical of the 
Midlands metal trades (see Allen [1929] 1966), the central feature being an 
internal subcontracting system. In such a system, the firm's subcontrac-
tors, or "servants" as they were referred to, were paid by their employers, 
or "masters," according to an established price list for each piece pro-
duced. These verbal agreements stipulated that a certain number of items 
be produced by a specified time. These adult male contractors, in turn, 
hired their own workers, mostly—although not exclusively—family 
members or relatives, young boys and women who were paid day wages. 
Evidence provided to the Children's Employment Commission (Royal 
Commission on Children's Employment [RCCE] 1862) in 1862 indicates 
that, by that time, all but two of the large number of young boys at the 
firm were hired on this basis. The Report also provides a more detailed 
picture of these hiring practices and the working conditions at the foun-
dry: 
719. Charles Curleyy age 10.—"Thread knuckles," i.e., put parts of 
hinges together, "pun" dust, take up scrap (waste metal), take out 
sides (of moulds), riddle sand, skim metal, i.e., take off the surface of 
the moulten iron from the top of the pot. . . . The other younger boys 
do much the same. Come at 6 a.m. or a little before, and leave at 6V2 
or 6lA p.m. Meals in here. . . . Get 3s. 4d. a week. 
720. George Moore, age 9.—Am 10 next year, but don't know when. 
Work with father at the same work as the last boy. Was never at 
school except on Sunday. 
721. Thomas Ferrars, age 20.—"Run sides," i.e., put sand into 
moulds. Went to work at between 7 and 8 years old, blowing bellows 
and helping the man. . . . Believe the queen is a woman, but do not 
know what her name is, or if it is Victoria. 
722. James Ferrars, age 17, brother of the last witness.—Went to 
school last Sunday. Did not before, because I had no clothes, and 
never was at any school in my life, and have not been taught any-
thing. 
The commissioners added, parenthetically, that both brothers "are 
squalid and feeble looking; and the elder, though over 20, looks quite a 
boy, and so thin that every rib could be counted, the shirt being half 
gone" (RCCE 1862, pp. 144-45). 
The foundry was divided into uncovered, partitioned shops that 
housed each of the subcontractors. Early record books of the firm 
identified shop accounts by the name of each subcontractor: Thompson's 
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Brass Shop, Steven's Shop, and the like (Church 1969). Given the exis-
tence of a dual-wage contract system, that is, the combination of both 
piece and day rates, the subcontractor's profit was dependent on his 
ability to hire the right number of assistants to complete the job and to 
obtain the maximum productivity from these workers. Occasionally, such 
a margin was not realized within the terms of the contract, and the 
subcontractor would have to draw on his employers to pay his workers. 
Accounts entitled "Workmen's Debts" appear in the early records of the 
firm and were, at times, substantial (Church 1969, p. 56). These debts 
had then to be repaid in weekly installments to the masters. Whereas 
some firms at this time rented space and equipment to subcontractors and 
may also have relied on outwork or external contracts, Kenricks exercised 
somewhat greater control over its work force. It did not rent space, nor 
did the turners pay "lathe money," the common custom of compensating 
employers for power and light (Allen 1966, p. 159). Thus, subcontractors 
at Kenricks owned no tools, equipment, or inventory. 
In addition, subcontractors at the firm signed an agreement that bound 
them to the works for a certain period, ranging from one to five years; this 
restricted the easy movement from one works to the next that some 
master craftsmen were known for (Pollard 1968). Journeyman appren-
tices were similarly bound to the company rather than to contractors, and 
thus the firm was responsible for their training and payment. The firm 
deducted a specified amount from their rate of payment for tuition. 
Again, this practice was somewhat unusual, as most firms left this task 
completely to subcontractors. Thus, a relatively large number of young 
boys, girls, and women were paid day wages as underhands, assistants, 
or apprentices learning the trade under the direct supervision of adult 
male subcontractors working under piece arrangements (Church 1969, 
p. 58). 
For the better part of the 19th century, the technology involved in the 
production of hollowware remained fairly primitive, consisting of molds 
and hand-held tools that aided the process of casting and dressing the 
product (Hawkes Smith 1838; Kenrick [1866] 1967). Steam-powered ma-
chinery was introduced at Kenricks sometime between 1805 and 1812, 
replacing horse-driven lathes. Continued capital expenditures occurred 
through the 1860s, following upswings in the business cycle, yet none of 
these improvements or additions to the plant and equipment had any 
dramatic effect on the labor process or craft skill. In fact, Kenricks en-
gaged a number of inventors who had developed machine tools to replace 
manual implements. The pursuit of one such turning machine in 1841 
was relinquished, however. William Kenrick explained: "The lathes used 
for turning hollow-ware are the ordinary round and oval lathes, the 
turning tool being held and directed by the workmen. Though more than 
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one trial has been made to introduce a self-acting lathe for the purpose, 
the attempt has been abandoned on its appearing that no savings in cost 
could be made by the exchange of a simple lathe for the more complicated 
machine" (Kenrick 1967, p. 106). 
Competition in the hollowware trade was relatively brisk during the 
first half of the 19th century, engendered by the relative ease of entry into 
the trade, low capital investment, and, at times, "higher than 'normal' 
profits" (Church 1969, p. 65). Although the specific number of firms 
engaged in the trades during this early period is unavailable, the evidence 
indicates that a number of general foundries produced various forms of 
hollowware (Allen 1966, pp. 20-23). By developing and adapting new 
techniques to improve the quality of its products and by reinvesting its 
profits, Kenricks grew during this time. The number of employees fluc-
tuated between 250 and 400, following vacillations in the economy. Over-
production produced a depression in 1830, followed by a deflationary 
period that lasted, with the exception of 1836, into the 1840s (Allen 1966). 
In response to this steady decline, eight of the largest firms agreed to fix 
prices in an effort to halt sliding profits (Church 1969, p. 66). In addition, 
shift work began at Kenricks in the early 1840s in the newly built enamel-
ing section of the works and was thus staffed around the clock. According 
to the testimony provided to the Children's Commission, this was done in 
order to keep the furnace alight continuously: "Three young boys from 11 
or 12 upwards are employed from about nine or ten hours in attending the 
men" (RCCE 1862, p. 144). By the 1860s, attrition from the business 
cycle left only 16 firms in the area that identified themselves as makers of 
cast hollowware. 
SHAPING STRUGGLES: PATRIARCHY A N D CODOMINATION, 
1791-1867 
The preceding narrative characterizes production at the firm from its 
inception to the 1860s, and I would now like to summarize the implica-
tions of these conditions for the politics of production. While variations in 
the organization of work from one firm or trade to the next existed, an 
important aspect of subcontracting as a general system of production was 
that it represented a transition from domestic to "modern" factory pro-
duction. Littler (1982) argues that three types of industry-specific produc-
tion relations are present in the internal-contract period and have thei r 
origins in this early period: (1) familial relations and control, (2) the role of 
the master craftsman and craft control, and (3) gang-boss control of w o r k 
teams. 
The first two of these characteristics were evident at the Kenricks f i rm 
and throughout the Midlands metal trades during this period. As the 
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Children's Employment Commission reports indicate, it was not uncom-
mon for young boys to be working alongside their fathers in the foundry. 
As Hartmann (1976, pp. 149-50) points out, the existing patriarchial 
social relations of the prefactory period were extended into the early 
factory, and "capitalists took advantage of this authority structure, 
finding women and children more vulnerable, both because of familial 
relations and because they were simply more desperate economically." 
While the contractors at Kenricks were more numerous and less powerful 
than some master craftsmen such as shipwrights (Pollard and Robertson 
1979, p. 164), they had considerable control of the labor process that 
derived from their authority and skill in their shops. Traditional patterns 
of production were also reflected in the workweek itself; Saturday was a 
half-holiday and the men "played away" on "St. Monday" or Tuesday. 
Thus, the workweek was often compressed into intensive three- or four-
day periods, with a norm of 67.5 hours worked. 
In establishing their firms, employers were able to exploit characteris-
tics of production from the earlier domestic period and at the same time to 
enjoy some of the benefits of a larger production base. By engaging 
subcontractors, the owners were able to avoid the responsibility of or-
ganizing, supervising, and controlling the production process and to 
share some of the financial risks. Moreover, the fact that each subcontrac-
tor was engaged in producing different product lines and struck indepen-
dent piece-rate agreements with the owners meant that the subcontrac-
tors had few common interests. This system took advantage of craft 
control at a time when capital was dependent on the skill of these men 
and their workers to produce quality goods for its markets. 
In summary, Kenricks was able to secure a firm place in the Midlands 
hollowware trade by carrying out production under a patriarchically 
based factory regime (Burawoy 1984). Under this regime, although sub-
contractors retained control over the labor process, (1) they and their 
laborers had little option but to sell their labor power; there was no 
minimum social wage, no support from rural subsistence, and the major-
ity of workers were subject to the family-based authority of the patriarch; 
(2) there was no state intervention in the form of labor legislation to 
protect labor from arbitrary despotism; and (3) competition led to the 
intensification of work and the extension of the workday. 
The social relations of production involved in the piece- and day-wage 
internal contract system at Kenricks were reproduced by this despotic 
regime. Adult male subcontractors, pressured by their contractually 
agreed on production quotas and price lists, had to intensify both their 
work and their assistants' productivity in order to turn a profit— 
especially during deflationary periods—since piece-rate contracts did not 
necessarily change with economic conditions. The assistants, mostly 
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young boys but some women also, were paid day wages, and hence the 
subcontractor had a profit incentive to "sweat" these workers with long 
hours and shift work. As Littler (1982, p. 78) and Hobsbawm (1964, 
p. 298) before him have pointed out, this system of production involved a 
form of codomination: between the master and subcontractor and, in 
turn, between the contractor and his assistants. Consequently, the system 
encouraged petty capitalist motivations on the part of these laboring 
subcontractors. The patriarchal regime of the factory provided the system 
of control and left the majority of workers with little choice but to engage 
in the process, learn the trades, and, if they were male and fortunate 
enough, move on to hiring their own assistants. Thus, in this period, the 
conditions of the factory regime permitted labor-intensification strategies 
in response to crises of profitability by "successfully" containing shop-
floor struggles and possible resistance. 
THE GENESIS OF PATERNALISM, 1868-1891 
The 1860s set the stage for significant changes in the organization of work 
in Britain. The severe conditions of employment throughout the indus-
trial regions became increasingly obvious (Engels [1844] 1968; Hobs-
bawm 1964). In particular, the treatment of children became a focal point 
of criticism by both the public and politicians. The general prosperity of 
the times provided the context for "enlightened" reforms; the metal 
trades, until this time free from "legislative interference," became subject 
to state intervention. Some of the more significant legislation having 
specific consequences for the trades were the Factory Acts Extension Act 
and the Workshops Act of 1867.2 These regulations restricted the employ-
ment of children between the ages of eight and 13 to 30 hours a week, 
their nocturnal employment was prohibited, and they were required to 
have 15 hours of schooling per week. 
The tradition of family employment, so prevalent during the internal-
contract period, was severely criticized by the children's commissioner in 
1862; he stated that the practice, while "probably very convenient," was 
"very much to the prejudice of the children and young persons employed" 
(RCCE 1862, p. 53). The conditions of work at Kenricks appear to have 
been similar to those throughout the trades and were described by Wil-
liam Kenrick as "though often severe not injurious" (Kenrick 1967, 
p. 108). Yet, a factory inspector wrote in 1869 that the hollowware mills 
and foundries of West Bromwich (presumably including the Kenricks 
works) were, for the most part, dirty, ill ventilated, and "scarcely fit for 
anyone to work in" (Factory Inspectorate 1869, p. 271). 
2 Earlier acts had restricted the employment of children in specific industries (e.g. , 
printworks in 1845). The Extension Act of 1867, however, restricted their employment 
in any manufacturing process in which 50 or more people were involved. 
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Economic times were good for the hollowware manufacturers from 
1869 through 1872. Production and output soared throughout the trades 
of the Midlands, culminating in 1872, which was described by one Bir-
mingham paper as being "rarely equalled and never surpassed for its 
great and general prosperity" (Allen 1966, p. 199). William Kenrick esti-
mated that at this time the trade employed 2,430 workers, including 
1,370 men, 900 boys, and 160 women and girls and that his firm em-
ployed between one-sixth and one-quarter of the industry's work force 
(Kenrick 1967, p. 108). During this time, prices and wages increased as 
workers throughout the district began to demand—some through 
unionized representation (e.g., the brassworkers)—a share of the profits 
as well as a reduction in working hours. At Kenricks, John Arthur stated 
that, during this time, "The wages of half-timers have nearly doubled 
since the Factory Act came in, and of course all labour has gone up. We 
have had to increase our men's wages in some departments from 10 to 20 
per cent in consequence of the great dearth of boy labour or the great 
prosperity of the country" (Factory and Workshops Acts Commission 
[FWAC] 1876, vol. 7, p. 333). 
While reducing hours was resisted by many employers, others wel-
comed the changes, particularly in larger firms where the shortage of 
child labor left contractors with few options concerning their work force 
(Allen 1966, p. 208). They could employ continuous shifts of young work-
ers (with considerable disruption to the work process), hire more expen-
sive, older help, or (as John Arthur Kenrick would later testify to the 
commissioners) they could, as his firm had done, substitute "idiot" for 
child labor on the night shift (FWAC 1876, vol. 7, p. 332). Moreover, 
even at the cost of losing hours, a reorganization of the workweek would 
impart some rationality to an otherwise inefficient domestic pattern of 
work. A number of employers had complained in testimony to the Chil-
dren's Employment Commission in 1862 that the continued observance of 
"St. Monday" and the like resulted in erratic work habits and production 
output. It was pointed out that, in one well-established firm, casters 
began work sometime around midday on Tuesdays (1862, p. 57). Thus, 
many larger employers, as well as labor, had an incentive to reorganize 
the workweek. Sometime in the beginning of the 1870s, the normal work-
week at Kenricks became 53 hours, which was spread over five-and-a-
half days. 
A price slide in the heavy industries began in 1873, and the economic 
optimism of the previous few years turned to despair. By 1876, the coun-
try was in the throes of the "Great Depression," a deflationary period 
unparalleled in modern times (Landes 1969). Moreover, competition from 
American, French, and German producers challenged Britain's tradi-
tional dominance in the metal trades. In an effort to restrain competition 
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among themselves, the British manufacturers came together in April of 
1872 to form the Cast Iron Hollow-ware and General Iron Founders 
Association. With John Arthur Kenrick as chairman, the association ag-
gressively sought to hold prices among its members. The 13 or so as-
sociate companies divided themselves into three grades of makers, Ken-
ricks being one of two first-grade producers. These two firms controlled 
more than 40% of the total sales of the association. The group artificially 
held prices so that those of the lower grades could stay in business but not 
compete with the others. 
The firm of Archibald Kenrick and Sons became a private limited 
company in August of 1883, and, by controlling the majority of shares 
and dominating the board of directors, the family consolidated and for-
malized its control over the business. This familial control laid the basis 
for an increasingly paternalistic relationship with the firm's employees. 
The masters regularly contributed to workers' benefit clubs, hospital and 
pension funds, and local charities. They provided medical assistance at 
the works, as well as a school and library, paid compensation to victims 
of accidents resulting from negligence on the part of the employers, and 
regularly attended local community and family affairs (The Midland 
Chronicle and Free Press, December 10, 1943; January 28, 1944). Ap-
prentices at the works, whose treatment the family had long prided them-
selves on, signed an "indenture" statement that attempted to tie their 
moral as well as work life to the firm. The document stated that appren-
tices "shall faithfully serve, their secrets kept, their lawful commands a n d 
those of their Foreman and Manager for the time being everywhere gladly 
do. . . . He shall not play at cards, dice tables or any other unlawful 
game. He shall not haunt taverns, alehouses nor absent himself from the 
service of the said company day or night unlawfully during the usual 
working hours; but in all things as a faithful Apprentice he shall behave 
himself to the said Company and theirs during the said term" (Church 
1969, p. 284). 
The usual term of the agreement was until the apprentice turned 21 
years old. Furthermore, the person responsible for training the apprentice 
was required, "at his own proper costs," to "find and provide for the s a i d 
apprentice during all the said term sufficient meat, drink, washing, m e d -
ical attendance, clothing, and all other necessaries" (Church 1969, 
p. 284). And, as Church went on to conclude, "For absence or b a d 
workmanship, the company retained the right to make deductions f r o m 
wages, gross misconduct as defined within the terms of the indenture t o 
be adequate grounds for dismissal without redress of payment of a c c r u e d 
wages" (p. 284). 
Kenricks had emerged from the depths of the depression a successful 
and prominent institution in the community. While sales for the f i r m 
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roughly doubled between 1870 and 1892, the deflationary conditions of 
the postdepression had taken their toll; net profits as a percentage of 
capital employed, which had peaked in 1876 at 26%, fell to less than 6% 
in 1886 (Church 1966, pp. 141-42). Faced with sliding profit ratios, 
increasing foreign competition (which threatened to disrupt the stable 
domestic market), an older and hence more expensive work force, and a 
shorter workweek, the firm found that its long-term profitability was 
dependent on action that would reduce operating costs. State intervention 
and cries of "sweating" prohibited use of the labor-intensification strate-
gies of the past. Moreover, since the skill-based techniques involved in 
the production of hollowware had remained unchanged since the begin-
ning of the century, such tasks could not be easily transferred to the 
semiskilled. 
Confronting this dilemma, management at Kenricks sought to reduce 
labor costs by adopting mechanized production techniques. Despite the 
drain on profits, Kenrick's board of directors decided on incorporation to 
pursue an aggressive strategy of expansion of the company's physical 
plant, product diversification, and acquisition. These tactics were 
financed through a combination of available profits, bank loans (John 
Arthur Kenrick had been a member of the board of directors of Lloyds 
Bank since 1877), and personal savings. Between 1884 and the turn of the 
century, the firm nearly doubled its investment in physical plant in West 
Bromwich alone, and by adding new product lines and acquiring almost 
a dozen competitors and related companies during the period, the com-
pany diversified its production base. 
The first machines adopted on a wide scale were stamping presses, 
which produced pan covers from a single piece of metal, with no seams. 
These covers were patented by Frederick Ryland, a young engineer and 
production supervisor at Kenricks. More significant, however, was the 
introduction of molding machines in the summer of 1888—again, in-
troduced by Ryland—which were designed to cut labor and raw material 
costs and to produce more perfect products. Accompanying the introduc-
tion of the machinery were redundancy notices for a number of skilled 
workers (Church 1969, p. 87; Midland Chronicle and Free Press, July 4, 
1891). 
In response to these notices, the turners and tinners, subcontractors at 
Kenricks, demanded that those recently dismissed be reinstated and that 
they replace those workers since hired to work the machines. Moreover, 
the workers called for an increase of 15% over current prices for those 
working on the new machines. A week later, the employers flatly rejected 
the demands "in the interests of the public and the trade," stating that 
they could not "disguise from ourselves that the real object you have in 
view is to make the advantageous workings of the molding machines . . . 
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impossible [and] having regard to the interest of the public and the trade, 
respectfully but resolutely to decline to accede to your proposals" (West 
Bromwich Weekly News, February 23, 1889). The evidence indicates that 
no further action was taken by the men and that those dismissed re-
mained so. 
Shortly after this episode, turners at Kenricks associated themselves 
with a more general movement of turners throughout the hollowware 
trade to raise and standardize piece rates and working conditions. This 
movement was brought about by officials of a local assembly of the 
Knights of Labor, an American labor organization that was attempting to 
organize local trades. A considerable number of Kenricks workers were 
said to belong to the organization, so many so that a local paper stated 
that the Kenricks workers constituted an entire "lodge" by themselves 
(1West Bromwich Weekly News, February 7, 1890). The demands put 
forth included (1) that all employers in the United Kingdom adhere to a 
standard price list, (2) that the price of selling swarf (metal shavings) be 
raised and that the number and payment of apprentices remain in the 
subcontractors' control (neither had been a custom at Kenricks, how-
ever), and (3) that workmen be paid a premium for adjusting holding 
"chucks" on hollowware turning equipment (a task the turners had done 
for some time; but they now felt they deserved additional compensation 
for this skill). 
Preliminary negotiations included the appointment of an outside arbi-
trator, who solicited the demands of both sides. The men submitted the 
above demands and a new list. The masters agreed, in principle, to the 
idea of a standard price list (not a specific one), but only if the turners 
dropped their demands concerning privileges. In April 1889, after consid-
ering the statements of both sides, the arbitrator proposed a new price list 
but made no mention of privileges. The list was accepted by the men's 
representative and was abided by for 12 months from the start of the 
negotiations (January 28, 1889). While not pleased with the outcome, 
the workmen "honorably accepted the award without solicitation," as the 
masters later put it to the local papers. Soon after working under the new 
price list, and to the astonishment of both the men and the masters, the 
contractors found themselves in debt. It appeared that the arbitrator's list 
had raised prices on certain articles of which few were manufactured and 
lowered prices on articles in demand. Understanding the predicament, 
the employers at some works forgave the debt, raised prices on certain 
articles, and even returned control of the swarf and apprentices to the 
men. This, however, contributed to even less uniformity throughout the 
trade, which the men saw as unfair and which had the potential of 
creating ill feeling among them. 
In early January of 1890, the issues were again brought to the attention 
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of the masters by the men because the contracted for period was soon to 
expire. The turners put forth their original demands. The masters refused 
to consider them, suggesting that the two sides engage an arbitrator. This 
the men refused, citing their previous experience. Against the advice of 
the Knights of Labor, which called for negotiations, the turners issued a 
fortnight's notice to Kenricks and a dozen of the other mills in the region 
that, unless their demands were met, a strike would occur. Neither side 
conceded, and on January 30, 1890, two days after the expiration of the 
current list, the turners struck.3 
By the end of the first week of February, depleted stocks threatened to 
idle 3,000 workers throughout the trades. At Kenricks, 63 striking tur-
ners were able to shut down the works and place themselves and 500 of 
their fellow workers "at play." By the first week in March, the Cast-Iron 
Hollow-ware Makers Association met and agreed to "throw the doors 
open" on the tenth under the terms of the arbitrator's list plus 10% but 
stated that the swarf and apprentices belonged to the masters. None of 
the turners "put in an appearance," however. At Kenricks, management 
threatened to "give up the hollow-ware trade altogether, rather than be 
beaten," but they added that they would be able to do without the strikers 
completely in a few weeks. They were in the process of hurriedly training 
new turners, a decision that management claimed to regret but took " . . . 
in the interest of all our other employees" (The Birmingham Daily Ga-
zette, March 12, 1890). 
This step the turners had not anticipated. They assumed that the use of 
"blacklegs," or strikebreakers, would be self-defeating, as these unskilled 
men would spoil more work than they would finish. The employers 
pressed on with the trainees, however. Apparently intimidated by this 
development, the workers soon afterward returned to the shops and re-
sumed production under the final terms offered by management, thus 
ending a five-week walkout—the first significant labor dispute in Ken-
ricks's history. While for some men the settlement meant securing a 10% 
raise in current prices, for many others the raise cost privileges. 
For turners at Kenricks, participation in the strike had successfully 
advanced their position—at least in the short term. As Church (1969, 
p. 291) notes, however, the lesson of their first strike was not lost on the 
firm's directors. Feeling that they had been placed at a considerable 
disadvantage by the power displayed by the turners, and in keeping with 
their efforts to reduce costs, the directors at Kenricks initiated plans, less 
than a year after the strike, to mechanize turning at the works. Frederick 
Ryland produced a report in December 1891 outlining the cost of the 
3 Details of the strike are found in the West Bromwich Weekly News and The Birming-
ham Daily Gazette for the months January through March. 
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equipment and of the compensation to those who would become redun-
dant by both dismissals and the substitution of semiskilled females for 
skilled males. After a series of tests, he concluded that the machines 
would save an estimated £4,000 sterling a year in labor costs. Ryland had 
argued that, in addition to the machines, a total reorganization of the 
shop floor was necessary to yield optimal efficiencies. Ryland's "scientific 
management" perspective was apparently lost on the majority of the 
directors, however. Only the machines were added, and, on December 
24, 1891, the notices were issued. 
This time, the employers had drawn up an agreement that was first 
offered to the turners for their signatures, rather than simply dismissing 
the men. The agreement stated that "Messrs Archibald Kenrick & Sons 
Ltd (hereinafter called the employers) having introduced into their works 
Hollow-ware turning machinery contemplate having to dismiss from their 
employment a considerable number of journeymen turners now employed 
by them in the hand turning of Hollow-ware. . . . As the necessity of 
dismissing their workers as above mentioned arises from no fault on the 
part of the workmen themselves, the Employers are desirous of making 
such provision as is hereinafter mentioned for any workmen who may be 
so dismissed so as to assist them over the time that they will be out of 
employ whilst seeking new e n g a g e m e n t . . . " (Church 1969, p. 291). The 
document went on to outline clauses that allowed compensation to as 
much as half an average weekly wage, for 40 weeks, to those who would 
be let go. The offer, considered generous by many, as well as rising 
prosperity throughout the region, appeared to be adequate compensation 
for the men. The terms of the agreement were unanimously accepted by 
the 68 turners, and thus the installation of hollowware turning machinery 
took place with little organized resistance from labor at Kenricks. 
SHAPING STRUGGLES: T H E D E C L I N E OF PATRIARCHY A N D T H E 
F O U N D A T I O N S OF PATERNALISM, 1867-1891 
The last half of the 19th century remains a watershed in the transforma-
tion of work in Britain. Embedded in this period were the forces that 
would strip away the remaining vestiges of domestic production and 
foster the emergence of the "modern" factory. In the second period, 1867-
91, the state intervened to restrict the employment of children and 
thereby shook the foundation of patriarchal control and the ties that 
bound the family to the workplace. By the late 1880s, threats to 
profitability forced management to seek new ways of organizing the pro-
duction process, which was dominated by independent subcontractors. 
Capital responded with a strategy of mechanization that was aimed at 
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reducing both costs and the pivotal role played by turners in the labor 
process. 
In addition, many employers in the trades attempted to remove the 
traditional privileges of contractors that had laid the basis for their power 
and authority in the shops. Labor's skill on the shop floor, which capital 
had harnessed in the past, was now an obstacle to continued profit-
ability—reflecting the contradictory tension between capital's treatment 
of labor as a commodity and also as a necessary source of ingenuity 
(Cressey and Maclnnes 1980; Littler 1982). The solidarity displayed by 
the turners during the dramatic work stoppage of 1890 was evidence that 
the interdependent relationship between the masters and subcontractors 
was crumbling. Individual piece-rate bargaining and gentlemen's agree-
ments became a thing of the past as the turners appeared to have realized 
their common interests. 
How was it that Kenricks was later able to mechanize hollowware 
turning in the face of this potential collective interest? The answer lies in 
the conditions of the emerging factory regime that was undermining pa-
triarchy, the system of subcontracting, and working-class resistance. The 
first condition was the change from external to internal state intervention, 
which removed a cheap source of labor from the subcontractors' shops. 
This subverted both the financial and authoritative dominance of subcon-
tractors. The second was the market structure. Kenricks's leading posi-
tion in the oligopolistic hollowware industry provided a relatively stable 
market and the material means for financing welfare paternalism and the 
change from hand to machine turning, including payment of compen-
sation. 
While profits at the firm roughly followed the oscillations of the na-
tional economy, Kenricks's owners were able to insulate themselves 
(through their manufacturers' association) from potentially destructive 
market fluctuations by regulating prices and output. From its acquisi-
tions, the firm derived income as well as depreciation credits and an 
expanded sales base. This resulted in more predictable profit margins and 
stabler growth than if the firm had operated in a more competitive envi-
ronment, and it contributed to the firm's appearance as a less risky invest-
ment when it attempted to raise capital from outside sources. Finally, 
subcontractors and laborers were still dependent on the sale of their labor 
for subsistence since no state-supported social wage existed. 
Kenricks's long-standing history as a major employer in the West 
Bromwich area, where "generation followed generation through the 
works" (Church 1969, p. 58), laid the basis for the increasingly paternal-
istic relationship with its workers and their community. Joyce (1980) 
summarizes these ideological and strategic developments throughout 
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British society: "The English experience of industrialism deserves to take 
its place in the 'golden age' of paternal, dynastic, European capitalism 
between 1850 and 1875. It can be argued that the English family firm of 
these years confronted the problem of size in a way that was more suc-
cessful than variants of the military-bureaucratic model of management. 
. . . Labour was no longer regarded as a commodity. Aiming at work and 
hope, the worker was appealed to as a member of the whole community, 
no longer isolated in the insubordination and poverty that were once 
taken as the mark of immorality" (1980, pp. 136-37). 
It is this kind of paternalism that characterized the emerging factory 
regime at Kenricks. This movement reflected a distinct shift in the at-
titude of employers concerning the welfare of their workers. Ultimately, 
however, this new ideology hinged on the mutual understanding that, in 
exchange for welfare provisions, the company could expect loyalty and 
hard work from its employees. Thus, the firm could elicit considerable 
respect and support from the community for its actions, including 
mechanization, which, of course, were done in the name of good business 
practice. One example of this attitude was a letter from the daughter of 
one worker, who had been a bearer at Archibald Kenrick's funeral, t o 
Timothy Kenrick in 1891 that summed up these feelings. The woman 
recalled how the elder Kenrick had visited her father, a molder, during an 
illness and stated that "Your grandfather was noted as a man of great 
perseverance in business, but never lost an opportunity of doing a good 
turn to his work people" (Church 1969, p. 292).4 
Thus, it was in this context of "stern yet considerate paternalism 
founded on mutual respect" (Church 1969, p. 292) that Kenricks was able 
literally to "buy off ' resistance by the turners, owing to a liberal compen-
sation package and an brief upswing in the economy that buoyed the 
confidence of those who would be displaced and who were seeking alter-
native employment. (One hand turner was reported to have opened a 
small grocery store with his compensation, according to Church [1969, 
p. 292].) Moreover, the installation of turning equipment, as with the 
molding machines two years before, concerned only management a n d 
workers at Kenricks, unlike the work stoppage of January 1890, which 
affected the entire industry. Without the solidarity of turners throughout 
the region, Kenricks workers were undoubtedly less optimistic abou t 
successfully resisting the new technology. 
In actuality, the resistance that was offered by subcontractors at Ken-
ricks appeared less focused on the installation of specific technologies a n d 
4 Church (1969, p. 293) also notes how, at the firm's centennial celebration held in 
1891, " . . . this paternalistic chord was struck again and again by employers, a n d 
work people" (see also Midland Chronicle and Free Press, July 4, 1891). 
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more on the particular issues of job security and payment structure. For 
example, subcontractors voiced objection not to the introduction of mold-
ing tables in 1888 but rather to the redundancy notices handed to col-
leagues and demanded that those men be rehired to work the machines, 
with a pay increase. Again, in 1890, although the turners' collective 
demands focused on the conditions of work, pay, and privileges, Ken-
ricks turners sought gains concerning only piece rates rather than the 
preservation of "privileges" that they had never enjoyed in the first place. 
These facts illustrate the generally less militant tendencies on the part of 
Kenricks employees and provide evidence of the power of paternalism in 
shaping working-class resistance and capacities. 
If paternalism was such a potent force in shaping potential resistance 
by Kenricks workers, one might ask, How was the strike of 1890 even 
possible? Two points may help explain this apparent anomaly. As Church 
(1969, p. 289) points out, the turners may have acted more from altruism 
than militancy in supporting the demands of other workers in the strike of 
1890 because the claims affecting the privileges of selling swarf and con-
trol over apprentices did not concern Kenricks workers. Since it was the 
Knights of Labor that had initiated the demands leading to the strike and 
since Kenricks workers were highly visible in that organization, they 
might have felt compelled to participate. And as Joyce (1980, p. 68) 
observes, even when strikes occurred during the era of paternalism, they 
were more passive than combative. The work stoppage of 1890 seems to 
have had this character. While there was definitely a dispute, hostilities 
were minor. A local newspaper account paraphrased the workers' spokes-
men during the strike of 1890: . . inasmuch as although the men are on 
strike a most friendly feeling existed between the men and their employ-
ers, and there was no desire that any unnecessary friction should be 
created" (Birmingham Daily Gazette, February 5, 1890). 
In the end, the forces and conditions existent under the paternalistic 
regime proved instrumental in the demise of the system of subcontracting 
and its associated handicraft production. In retrospect, the resistance 
offered by the turners was mistakenly centered solely on payment struc-
ture. It appears that they did not see a threat from the machines (i.e., they 
were willing to work the machines but within the system of subcontract-
ing, over which they had considerable control). In the end, however, it 
was the machines that broke subcontracting and the turners' position in 
it. Once installed, the turning and other mechanized production equip-
ment had a dramatic effect on Kenricks's work force. In 1876, approxi-
mately one-third of the workers at Kenricks were young boys, women, 
and children. Yet, by 1894, they composed nearly 60% (FWAC 1876, vol. 
2, p. 331; Royal Commission on Labour 1892-94, vol. 7, pp. 198-99). By 
1903, there was a complete absence of hollowware turning apprentices at 
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the firm. The social organization of work by the more traditional form of 
subcontracting had given way to direct control of piece-rate machine 
"operatives" by an increasing number of company foremen. As Church 
(1966, p. 296) notes of this trend at Kenricks, " . . . the process whereby 
the skilled handi-craftsman retreated before the semi-skilled machine 
minder, was well advanced."5 
Thus, the real subordination of labor to capital at Kenricks, reflected in 
a strategy of mechanization, occurred under a paternalistic regime. This 
regime highlighted the condition of limited competition between firms 
and included both the complete separation of labor from a means of 
subsistence beyond the sale of their labor power and internal state inter-
vention. These conditions shaped the struggles concerning the mechani-
zation of hollowware in favor of capital, permitting the introduction of 
the new technology. In contradistinction to both Joyce (1980, p. 65) and 
Burawoy (1984, pp. 260-63), who argue that the bedrock of paternalism 
in the British textile industry was the real subordination of labor, the 
Kenricks case points to the possibility of just the opposite. In this in-
stance, limited competition provided the material basis, while paternal-
ism supplied the political foundation for the real subordination of labor. 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF T H E FACTORY REGIME 
I have criticized Burawoy (1984) for not adequately developing his ideas 
concerning the historical transformation of the factory regime. What my 
case study illustrates is that the movement at Kenricks, from patriarchy 
to paternalism, and the resulting real subordination of labor to capital 
were engendered by a combination of economic forces and the confronta-
tion of class interests that altered the context of production and rendered 
the existing technical and social organization of work obsolete. The tran-
sition is summarized in figure 1. The diagram illustrates how the move-
ment occurred over a period of time, and, hence, how the characteristics 
and conditions present in one regime overlapped the next period. Tha t is, 
all four conditions did not change at one time. The year 1867 marks the 
beginning of the decline of patriarchy and the rise of paternalism because 
that was the year of internal state intervention. Thus, the character of the 
factory regime began to change independently of the labor process until 
all four determinants of paternalism were present in the year 1891. 
5 Of course, some skilled occupations were created by mechanization (e.g., machine 
tool setters), but the net change was clearly an increase in the semiskilled. This trend 
occurred throughout other industries as well. E.g., as Allen notes, the percentage of 
semiskilled female labor in the tin-plate industry of the Midlands doubled from 1 8 % in 
1861 to 37% by 1911 (Allen 1966, p. 342). 
82 












Limited State Intervention 
/ 1 
1 
Internal State Intervention 
l 







Formal Subordination of Labor 
1 









1 1 I 1 1 I I I 
1820 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1910 
FIG. 1.—Periodization and characteristics of the factory regimes at Kenricks, 
1791-1891. 
The inflationary spiral of the early 1870s saw an increase in real wages, 
the removal of an inexpensive pool of child labor by the state, and the 
establishment of a shorter workweek. These actions reflect both the con-
cerns of the state, which was facing public criticism of the exploitation of 
child labor, and the general interest of all capitalists. That is, the rise in 
real wages boosted the purchasing power of workers at a time of over-
production as well as representing a concession by capital to the demands 
of labor. Moreover, the reduction in the workweek and the restriction of 
child labor both ensured the physical reproduction of labor power and 
served to quell rising criticisms of the system, thus bolstering the legiti-
macy of the state. However, the sheer volume of overproduction that 
flooded domestic markets and the rise in prices made British goods and 
raw materials less attractive on world markets, contributing to a dra-
matic price slide—the depression of 1876. In this deflationary period, 
previously increased wages and fewer working hours contributed to a 
profit squeeze, resulting in a restriction of capital accumulation. Thus, 
earlier efforts to resolve the problems of overproduction, wage demands, 
and threatened legitimacy had the contradictory effect of contributing to 
a new crisis of profitability during this economic downturn. 
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The severity of the downturn had a predictable effect on the already 
concentrated hollowware industry. Kenricks emerged from the crisis in a 
dominant market position, as it was able to acquire a number of its past 
competitors and firms in associated industries. However, the deflationary 
period following the depression and sliding profit ratios forced Kenricks 
to seek cost-cutting strategies. Given the changing context of production, 
however, the firm could not rely on the labor-intensification methods of 
the past. At this time, Kenricks turned to mechanization, a strategy it had 
rejected in the 1840s. In the later era, however, this approach had a 
number of attractive advantages: (1) it increased the productivity of 
labor; (2) the machines reduced the cost of labor by employing semiskilled 
rather than skilled labor; (3) the machines produced more perfect goods; 
and (4) the machines would remove the basis of the subcontractors' power 
in the labor process and at the bargaining table as well. 
Laboring subcontractors, however, found their position in the produc-
tion process threatened on all sides. The erosion of the patriarchically 
based contract system by the reduced participation of the family cut into 
the male contractors' power as well as their profit margin. They could no 
longer drive their workers as in the past. "Sweating " came under attack 
by politicians, unions, and the public. As Littler notes, "Few hands were 
raised to protect 'the slave-driving sub-contractor/ because new ideas, 
new methods, and new technology influenced employers to reach down 
for more control over the shop floor'' (1982, p. 79). 
In reaction to these pressures, subcontractors like the turners at Ken-
ricks, encouraged by local labor groups, engaged in a strategy of work 
stoppages with others throughout their industry to demand wage conces-
sions and to protest the encroachment of capital on their traditional do-
main. While the turners were able to draw on their pivotal role in the 
production process to achieve limited success with these actions, in the 
end, such demonstrations served only to convince capital of the necessity 
that it move against this potential power. 
CONCLUSION 
In As Sociology Meets History, Charles Tilly urges that we address a 
class of theoretical problems through the construction of "historically 
grounded accounts of collective action—in particular the conditions 
under which ordinary people who share an interest act, or fail to act, 
together on that interest. The accounts require historical grounding, most 
obviously, because the known means of action that are available to peo-
ple (a) vary significantly as a cumulative product of historical experience; 
and (b) strongly constrain the likelihood and the character of collective 
action" (1981, p. 215). By utilizing Burawoy's theoretical device, the 
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factory regime, and by integrating a more theoretically explicit idea of 
social change, I have sought to illustrate the historical conditions that 
shaped and transformed production politics at Kenricks. Two particular 
regimes were uncovered: one was characterized by despotism and patriar-
chy, and the other was based on paternalism. I have argued that patriar-
chy and its accompanying system of subcontracting regulated and repro-
duced the social relations of production and that, once undermined by 
social and economic contradictions, this regime gave way to an emerging 
paternalism. This paternalism, in turn, contributed to the less militant 
stance of Kenricks turners, shaping the struggles over mechanization in 
favor of capital. 
My analysis demonstrates a dynamic and flexible perspective for 
understanding the transformation of factory politics and changes in the 
labor process. This case study, as well as the work of others, highlights 
the considerable diversity under which the social relations of capitalist 
production have evolved (see Zeitlin 1979; Stone 1974; Montgomery 1979; 
Littler 1982). A number of authors have insisted that it is only through 
such detailed empirical analyses and not within "iron-law" theoretical 
perspectives that the complexity of workplace struggles may be revealed. 
This contention forces us, as Harvey (1982, p. 118) put it, " . . . to reflect, 
once more, upon the relation between the theory of the capitalist mode of 
production as a whole and the historical evolution of capitalist social 
formations." Yet, the uneven development of capitalism does not invali-
date a general theory of capitalist production and reproduction. Rather, it 
challenges us to understand the conditions that manifest historical diver-
sity. 
Resolving this dilemma is made easier if we accept Burawoy's argu-
ment—making the distinction between the process of production and its 
regulation by the conditions of the factory regime—and if we are more 
explicit in locating change within the dynamic of contradictions and crises 
endemic to a capitalist mode of production. This case study demonstrates 
that, within the social relations of production, both capital and labor are 
confronted by social and economic forces that compel action but do not 
determine its character. Thus, significant changes in the technical and 
social organization of work occur during critical historical periods in 
which either capital or labor is required to respond to contradictions 
emerging from the mode of production. While a response is necessary 
(e.g., for capital to maintain a profit margin or for labor to maintain a 
living wage), the character of the specific action taken is shaped by the 
immediate economic and social context, that is, the conditions of the 
present regime. This process is both dynamic and reflexive; action 
changes the conditions, which, in turn, shape future action. 
For example, Kenricks rejected mechanization techniques during the 
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competitive and deflationary 1840s because (1) it was dependent on craft 
skill for the high-quality goods it was known for—that was its competi-
tive advantage; (2) mechanized production was expensive, and the firm 
lacked the material means at this time; and (3) the firm could rely on the 
despotic exploitation of the family under the patriarchal regime to contain 
the shop-floor struggles. Thus, when faced with threats to profitability, 
the firm could engage in labor intensification strategies that were rela-
tively successful in increasing capital accumulation. Conditions had 
changed considerably, however, when the firm faced a deflationary profit 
squeeze in the 1880s. In this period, there was an erosion of patriarchal 
authority, which was undermined by state intervention, increased labor 
costs and restricted hours, and the threat of rising national labor organi-
zations; all representing attempts to mediate past crises that now ren-
dered the labor intensification strategies of the past impossible. Under 
these conditions, capital was forced to consider action that focused on the 
productivity of labor and on new methods of regulation. Limited compe-
tition, which resulted from both the centralization of capital through 
market dominance and the policies of a manufacturers' association, pro-
vided the foundation of paternalistic politics and regulation and the mate-
rial means for capital intensive methods. 
Finally, this analysis leaves us with at least two important questions: 
the first empirical, the second theoretical. First, in his own analysis of 
British cotton mills during the same historical period, Burawoy (1984) 
identifies patriarchal and paternalistic regimes similar to what I have 
described at Kenricks. What accounts for this pattern? How widespread 
was the emergence of paternalism in Britain at this time? Burawoy (1984, 
p. 263), following Joyce (1980), suggests that its appearance was contin-
gent on the size of the employer and the community. Additional empirical 
analyses across different firms and industries are necessary to reveal such 
variation. Second, what does the historical analysis of Kenricks tell us 
about the relationship between market structure and the labor process? 
As I see the case, Kenricks's market position played a crucial role in its 
implementing a strategy of mechanization. Marx (1976) theorized that i t 
would be under the competitive pressures of market despotism tha t 
mechanization would take place. Braverman (1974), however, contends 
that limited competition enables capital to confront the control of the 
labor process by the recalcitrant craft worker. Braverman was correct, a t 
least in the Kenricks case, but, as I have argued above, the relationship 
goes beyond market structure and must include other determinant condi-
tions shaping factory politics. 
The rich history of the Kenrick firm provides a unique opportunity to 
examine the confrontation of collective interests during a crucial period of 
British capitalism. By taking my cue from Burawoy (1983, 1984) and 
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distinguishing between the labor process and its regulation through polit-
ical apparatuses, I have illustrated the effect of factory regimes in regulat-
ing working-class resistance. Together with other studies of other firms 
across different historical junctures, we can further develop an analytical 
framework for understanding the conditions that shape the politics of 
production. 
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